


**SENSITIVE**

*CIA/SAVA / WIND 691220*



## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 20 December 1969*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**







*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~

## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968 - 1969


weekly average for each month




Dotted line shows current average for Dec 1969

OCTOBER—DECEMBER 1969


weekly data as reported\*




decreased from the previous week's 85 to 71 for this week.




also decreased from the 303 (updated) of last week to a reported 242 this week. The official totals will change as late reports are received and will be considerably lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN for these periods.




for the week stand at five groups, the first detected in NVN since 27 November. These groups probably will be accepted in the infiltration estimate with their strength of 2,024 raising identified infiltrators to about 17,400 since late October. Present data, thus, suggest pipeline inputs since 23 October total some 17,400 to 21,500.



decreased significantly from the very high 750 of last week to 500 this week. Of these totals, attacks by fire decreased from the 158 of the previous week to 102 for this week.



declined from the previous week's 2,396 to this week's 2,007.



information for the week ending 20 December not yet available in Washington.


\*Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The past week showed a decline in enemy initiated incidents of all types with a corresponding reduction in both friendly and enemy casualties. Despite numerous reports of plans for increased activity on the Communist holidays of 19, 20, and 22 December, enemy forces passed up these anniversaries without launching anything resembling the attacks some Allied officials had expected. It now appears probable that the present comparatively low level of activity will continue for the remainder of December with the possibility of isolated "high points." Enemy main force units along the border or in base areas remain generally out of contact.

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South Vietnam Developments

President Thieu's unsubtle efforts to force the National Assembly to oust three deputies accused of pro-Communist activities have exacerbated his relations with the legislature and provided his opponents with new grounds for attacking him. Almost certainly at government instigation, two demonstrations were held over the weekend, one of which resulted in the interruption of the Assembly's proceedings while the demonstrators harangued the legislators with anti-Communist speeches. There is evidence that Thieu encouraged this activity and that further demonstrations are planned as a prelude to the Assembly's discussion of the case scheduled for 29 December. This attempt at intimidation will probably reduce the chances that the legislature will lift the parliamentary immunity of the three legislators in question. The pressure tactics (which will generally be assumed to be GVN-inspired) may undermine Thieu's legislative program. These tactics will also provide more fuel for recent charges that President Thieu is becoming more isolated and dictatorial.

Despite the above, prominent South Vietnamese military and political figures, including those who are not close to President Thieu, appear to agree that there is no serious threat of an overthrow of the Thieu government at this time. A group of former associates of Vice President Ky met on 13 December and concluded that a coup by the military is neither wise nor justified at the present time, and that civilian groups opposed to Thieu lack capability. Third Corps Commander, General Tri, whose troops would be responsible for countering any such attempt, also discounts the likelihood of a coup under present circumstances.

#### Communist Developments

Hanoi may be having difficulty in maintaining enthusiasm for military duty among its military age group. An authoritative editorial on 15 December revealed that the regime once again is trying to improve popular response to Army recruiting. A special Army conference earlier this month also implied that recruiting efforts have sagged lately. The regime's instruments of control are certainly capable of providing the needed manpower, but recurring attempts in the past year to improve the Army's image suggest that Hanoi may be facing new problems of morale and motivation. The return of thousands of wounded this year may have contributed to a growing realization in the North that the war situation is considerably less favorable than has been depicted in official accounts.

#### Other Developments

Despite bad weather and continued U.S. bombing, the Communists have moved rapidly to restore the capability of their logistics system in the Laos Panhandle. Most of the roads had been reopened to truck traffic by mid-November. In recent weeks there has been a sharp increase in truck traffic moving into and within the Panhandle. This upsurge in logistics activity appears so far to be on about the same level as last year following the rainy season. A high level of supply flows is anticipated in the coming months in order to overcome the effects of U.S. bombing, to support the resumption of personnel infiltration, to restore stockpiles, and to prepare for possible intensified military action in South Vietnam.

~~Top Secret~~